Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence, describes the theory and philosophy of intelligence as practiced by the United States Marine Corps. It provides Marines a conceptual framework for understanding and conducting effective intelligence activities. The Marine Corps’ view of intelligence is based on our common understanding of the nature of war and on our warfighting philosophy as described in MCDP 1, Warfighting.
Western conceptions of the international struggle among nations (and other political actors) often use binary war or peace labels to describe it. The actual truth is more complicated. Actors on the world stage are always trying to create a relative advantage for themselves and for their group. Sometimes this maneuvering leads to violence, but the use of violence to achieve goals is more often the exception than the rule. Instead, most actors use other means in their competitive interactions to achieve their goals. The competition continuum encompasses all of these efforts, including the use of violence.
This publication is about winning in combat. Winning requires many things: excellence in techniques, an appreciation of the enemy, exemplary leadership, battlefield judgment, and focused combat power. Yet these factors by themselves do not ensure success in battle. Many armies, both winners and losers, have possessed many or all of these attributes. When we examine closely the differences between victor and vanquished, we draw one conclusion. Success went to the armies whose leaders, senior and junior, could best focus their efforts—their skills and their resources—toward a decisive end. Their success arose not merely from excellence in techniques, procedures, and material but from their leaders’ abilities to uniquely and effectively combine them. Winning in combat depends upon tactical leaders who can think creatively and act decisively
Tactical success in combat does not of itself guarantee victory in war. What matters ultimately in war is strategic success: attainment of our political aims and the protection of our national interests. The operational level of war provides the linkage between tactics and strategy. It is the discipline of conceiving, focusing, and exploiting a variety of tactical actions to realize a strategic aim. With that thought as our point of departure, this publication discusses the intermediate, operational level of war and the military campaign which is the vehicle for organizing tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives.
This publication is designed to give Marine leaders a solid, common understanding of the fundamental nature of military strategy that is inherent in each military action. Its intent is to give the reader the basic knowledge required to think “strategically,” that is, to be able to examine the particulars of any specific situation and understand the political and military factors behind the use of military force
First published in September 2001, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, provided a bridge between the maneuver warfare philosophy articulated in our first nine MCDPs and the tactics, techniques, and procedures contained in our warfighting and reference publications. It focused on describing the role of the Marine Corps component in providing, sustaining, and deploying Marine Corps Forces at the operational level of war and on how the largest of our Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), the Marine expeditionary force, conducted operations at the tactical level. Developed just prior to, and published shortly after, the momentous events of 11 September 2001, the original edition reflected the language and operational constructs prevalent within joint doctrine at that time. Key among them were the notions of “war” versus “military operations other than war,” as well as the unstated, but imbedded, belief that the ability to defeat a conventional adversary granted the ability to succeed against “lesser” foes.
With the shift of U.S. strategic focus to great power competition, interest in industrial mobilization for a long-term, high-intensity conflict has returned. However, the highly consolidated and fragile U.S. defense industrial base is not designed to meet this challenge. To gain insight into the ability of the defense industrial base to meet the demands of great power conflict, this project reviewed the history and literature on industrial mobilization and then analyzed the time needed to replace contemporary weapon systems’ inventory at peacetime and surge production rates.
Over the past three decades, remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) – also known as drones – have acquired increasing importance in modern warfare. Originally designed to perform surveillance missions during the Cold War, drones gained prominence during the post-Cold War era through their ability to gather real-time intelligence over conflict-prone areas, particularly in support of humanitarian interventions. Following the onset of the global war on terror, drones acquired a further, arguably more significant function: armed with precision-guided munitions, they enabled Western armed forces to identify, track, and accurately strike targets from afar, reducing the need for troops on the ground.1 Simultaneously, drones’ allegedly low costs, limited technological sophistication, and ease of employment also enabled their rapid proliferation to dozens of countries around the world.2 According to some, the major implications are yet to come: drones’ unique capabilities promise in fact to revolutionize warfare. Consequently, militaries could eschew complex and expensive force structures to wage war: they would just need drones. As countries face stronger incentives and fewer constraints for using force, the growing availability of drones coupled with their capabilities deserve attention because this trend risks ushering in a new era of global instability and conflict.3
Created in 1951 by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to endow NATO Allies’ officers with a forum for strategic education and politico-military reflection, this year the NATO Defense College is celebrating its 70th anniversary. In a world of rapid change and growing uncertainty, the best way to honor the past is to prepare for the future. This Policy Brief contributes to this goal by looking at the future of Professional Military Education (PME). Based on the recent Conference of Commandants,1 the discussion is divided into three parts: what the future of warfare is, what skills future warfighters will need to possess, and how professional military education will have to change accordingly.
NATO’s previous summits in Madrid (2022) and Vilnius (2023) took place against the background of Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine. Important decisions to strengthen security on the north-east flank included bolstering NATO’s military presence in the Baltic region, the adoption of a new generation of regional defence plans, and the refreshment of the pledge to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. Regional security has been further enhanced by Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO. Major new decisions that would further strengthen the security of the Baltic region are unlikely to be taken at this year’s Washington Summit. The main challenge for the Baltic states in Washington will be to ensure that the decisions of earlier years are implemented. NATO’s track record of addressing gaps in Baltic defence is uneven and shortcomings and persistent problems on NATO’s side remain a source of constant concern for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Until these issues are addressed, the Baltic region will remain a vulnerability for NATO.
芬兰和瑞典申请加入北约的决定是俄乌冲突造成的最显著的地缘政治后果之一。这份报告主要探讨芬兰和瑞典加入北约后波罗的海国家的安全和防御前景。
