In war studies one can distinguish between the futurists on the one side and the traditionalists on the other: those holding that everything in today’s wars is new and unprecedented versus those holding that the nature of war is enduring and that what happens today on and off the battlefield has already been seen throughout history albeit in different guises. Within the debate between these two camps the question persists whether so-called hybrid war is war at all, whether we even need the ‘hybrid’ label, and whether we should not just focus on kinetic large scale warfare and allow the minor stuff to function as a safety valve to release tension.
Digital technology is an element of power in the international system as well as an area for competition among countries. Considering the economic weight and political voluntarism of the U.S., China, and the EU, those three poles of power have received a lot of attention when it comes to their technology policies. This study aims to shift our gaze toward countries outside of the trio. Digital middle powers are those countries that are caught in the middle of the power play in an emerging multipolar international system where digital technology is a determining factor of power. It also refers to countries with established or growing clout in digital technology, and which are regional leaders or global ones in certain sectors.
The number of small satellites in orbit has increased rapidly over the last decade, and the growth of this sector is expected to accelerate even more in coming years. In 2011, fewer than 100 satellites weighing less than 600 kilograms (kg) were launched into Earth’s orbit. In 2020, more than 1,200 such satellites were launched – the vast majority of which were owned by commercial entities. 1 Licenses have been issued to allow the launch of thousands more. These trends have important implications for military users around the world. Small satellites offer unique capabilities and economic opportunities, but also pose new threats. This briefing provides an overview of benefits, weaknesses, and strategic implications of small satellite technology, discusses current government and commercial efforts in this area, and addresses potential future developments.
Does the employment of military cyber capabilities constitute war? How this question is answered is essential to the study of war; the development of military cyber doctrines, units, and education; and the intentional employment of state or military cyber capabilities against other states both in peacetime and war. Contemporary literature portrays cyber means as effective and considers cyber war or warfare as being waged. Legal theory and state position analysis thus follow the black letter of the law, especially focussing on whether the use of cyber capabilities constitutes the use of force or armed attack.
One year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, certain assumptions about the utility of cyber operations during wartime can now be put to the test. Russian cyber salvos opened this war, but they failed to achieve their objectives in the face of a resilient cyber defender. Joint cyber/conventional warfighting is still hard to implement due to its uncertain effects, the potential for spill-over, malware development cycles, and differing operational tempos. Cyber operations against Ukraine have not (yet) achieved major strategic effects in reducing Ukraine’s capacity to resist. Additionally, Russian information operations targeting Ukrainian and Western audiences fell on deaf ears. The greatest value of cyber operations therefore still appears to lie in their intelligence and reconnaissance functions.
A close reading of Russia’s nuclear statements and actions during the first seven months of its war against Ukraine reveals a threefold approach. Moscow is walking a fine line between a well-crafted and successful deterrence strategy to prevent foreign military intervention; a more modest and rather unsuccessful attempt at dissuading foreign aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; and incremental nuclear coercion against Kyiv that spurred Western deterrence messaging in response. This analysis reveals a careful Russian approach, suggesting that cost-benefit calculations are likely to continue to render nuclear escalation unlikely. However, nuclear use cannot be fully discounted, particularly if war-related developments severely imperil the survival of Russia’s regime.
In 2000, the Strategic Partnership between India and Germany symbolised new-found commonalities shared by the countries in the era of globalisation. More than two decades later, the agreement requires an upgrade in order to address the changing international, regional and national dynamics. This upgrade should include, first, further deepening of the strong pillars of the relationship, i.e. in the fields of trade, economics, science and technology. Second, the agenda should be broadened to accord greater priority to areas including defence, security, political relations and people-to-people contact. Finally, both sides should acknowledge their differences with regard to their respective national interests and foreign policy objectives, and should find ways to bridge the gap. The focus on common interests in specific policy areas should be the guiding principle for enhancing India-Germany bilateral and international collaboration.
